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FACTS, NORMS AND EXPECTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS 





In this paper we want to explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative 
justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it 
worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we 
should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively 
applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or 
businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is 
empirically true: i.e., that a given function allows us to predict the choices of  that particular 
class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in 
accordance to this pattern in the 18
th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when M. 
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FACTS, NORMS AND EXPECTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
 
Expected utility functions (EUF) are considered the «industry standard» to model decision-
making processes, especially in economic theory: the hypothesis states that among an array 
of uncertain outcomes, an agent will choose the sequence of events which maximizes the 
addition of the utility of each one of them weighed by its probability. However, the number 
of empirical deviations documented by psychologists and experimental economists suggest 
that their positive basis are not as solid as it was originally expected in the early 1950s. At 
that point, there were many who argued, after Milton Friedman (1953: 21), that there was 
evidence enough to grant a positive status to EUF-grounded models on the basis of their 
predictive success alone. However, there were already empirical failures, such as Allais 
paradox, that prompted a different response: Leonard Savage (1972: 67) argued that EUF 
should be incorporated into a normative theory of  decision-making, so that the rationality 
of a choice be judged according to the mathematical axioms defining EUF. Any deviation 
would constitute a transgression of a decision rule, rather than a simple exception to a 
model.  
Both approaches assumed a dichotomy between facts and values (or positive and normative 
economics or decision theory). Yet it seems as if this gap had often been bridged in both 
directions. The normative appeal of the principles defining EUF may provide indirect 
evidence of their empirical plausibility, in spite of contrary evidence (Starmer 2005: 278). 
In this paper, we will focus on an alternative direction of fit: how the empirical content 
captured by EUF contributes to their normative standing.  
The normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) is very often conceived on a priori 
grounds without empirical counterparts: we would be compelled to act in accordance to its 
postulates by virtue of intuition alone. E.g., EUT assumes, as every utilitarian theory, that 
we want the most to achieve our goals; by a purely conceptual examination of its axioms, it 
can be shown that EUT secures the coherence in our decisions that is necessary (though not 
sufficient) to rationally attain that goal (e.g. Savage 1972: 102). This justification of EUT 
as a prescriptive rule is thus similar to many other moral arguments in the analytic tradition. 
EUT would transform our intuitions about rational decision-making into normative 
statements of general scope. Testing them through series of examples and counterexamples 
(e.g., the Allais paradox) would lead us either to more refined versions of the theory or to 
an alternative one that is judged more concordant with our intuitions.  
However, just as empirical EUT receives some support from normative considerations, its 
normative cogency also benefits from empirical evidence in a way that, in our opinion, 
cannot be captured by this aprioristic argumentative strategy. It has often been signalled 
that rationality in economics is used like a thick term in which the normative and positive 
dimensions usually cannot be factored out (e.g., Mongin 2006). We want to show in this 
paper how they both interrelate in the prescriptive justification of EUF, according to a 
different argumentative pattern that recurs throughout  two centuries. The use of EUF 
would be here justified as long as they captured the decision rule actually applied by those 
considered wisest in making uncertain choices (businessmen, gamblers, insurers, etc.). The 









































8our goals, since their practical success provides compelling evidence of the virtues of their 
decision rules –independently of whether we can explain it in a priori analytical terms. We 
would be thus justified in adopting EUF as one of such rules if it can be empirically shown 
that they effectively predict the choices of these experts.  
This approach to normativity stems from the Aristotelian tradition, in which the opinion of 
the wisest (ta endoxa) is often considered the best possible premise for practical reasoning 
and should be adopted as such in our moral deliberations (Vega 1998). Kant excluded these 
sort of prudential concerns from the realm of ethics in favour of more general, 
inconditional, imperatives. Yet, the justification of EUF as prescriptive rules has drawn on 
this Aristotelian strategy since their very inception until our days. The purpose of this paper 
is to show how this argumentative pattern works in three different cases, to illustrate its 
cogency and scope. In §1, we will briefly discuss how EUF were originally conceived as a 
wise decision rule that solved the normative dilemma posed by the St. Petersburg paradox.  
In §2, we will analyze how Condorcet contested this solution since it failed to capture the 
criterion actually applied by the most expert decision-makers. In §3, we will see that 
precisely this objection recurred when Allais developed his paradox against the American 
School and how he defended his own theory as a better approximation to the expert’s 
criterion. In view of all this, we will briefly discuss by way of conclusion to what extent 
this strategy is still defensible to ground any prescriptive rule. 
1. 1730: EUF APPEAR 
Our first thesis is that EUF originally appeared embedded in a normative rule that allowed 
for the calculation of the just price of a gamble. Though Bernoulli’s invention is often 
presented as the first positive model of uncertain decision-making, we should pay more 
attention to the arguments that justified their introduction to appreciate its normative 
character
1. EUF came indeed to provide a general solution to a normative dilemma, known 
by early probability theorists as the Problem of Points (Franklin 2001: 258-320): how to 
distribute the stake among the gamblers when their game had been interrupted an one of 
them had a certain advantage that, intuitively, gave him the right to expect a bigger share.  
Let us briefly remind these antecedents. Pascal and Huygens introduced the concept of 
mathematical expectation to calculate such distribution on the basis of a legal analogy that 
any gambler could consider fair. According to a legal tradition that they probably received 
from the Schoolmen (Coumet 1972), a gamble could be compared to a mercantile insurance 
contract, in which both the insurer and the merchant assumed a risk in common expecting a 
certain payoff. On that principle, they should agree on a just price for the insurance 
balancing uncertainty and gain. Drawing on this comparison, Huygens solved the Problem 
of Points with the statement of a precise proportion between the wager (the price to take 
part in the game) and the likelihood of obtaining a particular reward. The rule would be 
stated as follows: a fair game would be that in which you bet what you could 
mathematically expect to win.   
Yet, as a result of the application of this rule to certain gambles, a certain paradox 
appeared. The jurist Nicolas Bernoulli (1687-1759) discovered in 1713 that there was a 
game of which the expected gain was apparently infinite
2. Imagine a coin-toss game, in 
                                                 
1 The historical details supporting the argument of this section are thoroughly discussed in Teira 2006.  









































8which the payoff function is 2
n-1: i.e., A pays B a coin if the coin turns up heads the first 
time (2
1-1=2
0), two coins if this result takes place in the second toss (2
2-1), four if it was in 
the third (2
3-1), and so forth. Considering that the corresponding probability amounts to 
1/2
n, the mathematical expectation of the game is given by an infinite geometric series of 
common ratio 1, that is, divergent
3. For more than two centuries, it was simply taken to be 
infinite (Jorland 1987). In other words, no fair price could be calculated for this game in 
accordance to the general rule established by Pascal and Huygens. Intuitively, we could not 
deem a just price (valeur juste) such an infinite mathematical expectation, since it seemed 
extremely unlikely to obtain it. Therefore, a revision of the ruled was called for to ensure 
that it could be generally applied (selon la justice) without incurring in paradoxes. 
Daniel Bernoulli undertook this task when his cousin Nicolas communicated him the 
paradox and submitted his results for publication in 1730-31 volume of the Commentarii 
Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae —after which the St. Petersburg paradox 
was named
4. Being a graduate in philosophy from Basel, Daniel was probably aware of the 
existence of different sorts of arguments to justify a norm,  and this is crucial for a proper 
assessment of his solution to the paradox. Instead of a general rule to calculate the just price 
of games, he proposed a deliberative criterion (non judicia, sed consilia) that could be 
applied discretionally: when choosing between uncertain prospects, try to maximize your 
expected utility. The mathematical expectation of a gamble could be calculated ignoring the 
personal circumstances of those who were to take part in the game. It was a rule as 
impartial in its generality as any judge would wish, and St. Petersburg paradox arised 
thereof: how could there be an exception? In the Bernoullian approach, it ceased to be so, 
since the utility that each particular gambler could derive from the expected gain 
(emolumentum lucri) was key to calculate the convenience of betting.  
Moreover, Bernoulli argued that this utility displayed a concave shape (“any amount of 
money is necessarily worth more to a less wealthy man”) which bounded the increase of the 
payoff function, solving the mathematical side of the paradox. To account for this particular 
shape, and justify his decision rule, Bernoulli argued that his functions captured and 
generalized the criteria implicitly applied by the most experienced decision makers, those 
who are of «fairly judicious» (quivis cordatus) –namely merchants and insurers.  
[T]hough a person who is fairly judicious by natural instinct might have realized 
and spontaneously applied much of what I have here explained, hardly anyone 
believed it possible to define these problems with the precision we have employed 
in our examples. Since all our propositions harmonize perfectly with experience, it 
would be wrong to neglect them as abstractions resting upon precarious hypotheses. 
(Bernoulli [1738] 1954: 31) 
In other words, Daniel’s rule made explicit the rule spontaneously applied by the wisest 
decision-makers (“the procedure customarily employed by merchants in the insurance of 
commodities transported by sea” (Bernoulli [1738] 1954: 29), so that we would be “well 
advised” (p. 30) if we adopt it for our own benefit when we face uncertain choices. In 1731, 
Daniel wrote to Nicolas: «If only the Bernoullis, who lost so much when the Müllers got 
                                                 


















































8bankrupt, paid attention to the very principles  that I establish actually, they would probably 
not have lost as much» (Daniel to Nicolas Bernoulli, 4/7/1731, apud J. Bernoulli 1975: 
565-66). Nicolas bitterly answered the following year: «Man muβ nicht zu viel Eyer in ein 
Korb legen, say our fellows from Basel. But what would you do if you needed to make the 
most of your money by crediting it to merchants, without being allowed to divide it up?» 
(ibid.) 
Bernoullian EUF ground thus a prescriptive rule for decision-making, whose normative 
force stems from its concordance with the actual practice of those socially acknowledged as 
best experts in dealing with risky prospects. Their practical success weights more than any 
a priori rationale in terms of the mathematical properties of these functions (e.g., long run 
considerations such as those examined by Daniel’s uncle, Jacob, in the fourth part of his 
Ars Conjectandi). Therefore, we may expect that the empirical accuracy of EUF to capture 
wise decision rules will be a crucial part of their normative justification. We may see to 
what extent this is so examining a not very well-known response that the Bernoulli 
functions received from the Marquis de Condorcet. 
2. 1780: THE DEBATE ABOUT EUF 
The fact that Condorcet was the favourite disciple of D’Alembert, who had been in turn the 
intellectual arch-enemy of Daniel Bernoulli, could perhaps account for the underlying 
motivation of his discrepancy with the latter’s rule. Provided that decisions between 
uncertain alternatives were made weighting the utility of the expected gains with their 
respective probabilities, Condorcet found much more objectable to claim it existed a 
continuous series of values derived from a concave utility function that could account for 
every possible decision a rational agent could made. In other words, he did not dispute the 
normative status of Bernoulli’s rule, but rather its empirical specification. 
Condorcet swam against the tide. Any XVIII
th century European could have quoted the so-
called widow offering parabola (Mark 12, 41-44), which exemplified the concavity of the 
utility function: any amount of money is necessarily worth more to a less wealthy man. A 
short time after the publication of the Bernoulli paper, the distinction between necessaries 
and superfluities was to become the matter of the controversy about luxury. Whatever 
opinion one may have had on this issue, the idea that marginal utility of wealth decreased 
(i. e. concavity of utility) was universal among thinkers interested in social matters (see e. 
g. Pradier 1996). Except for Condorcet: 
[B]ecause this principle is itself hypothetical, any amount of money is 
necessarily worth more to a less wealthy man; but it seems to us arbitrary to 
choose either Daniel Bernoulli’s law or any other one which could fulfil the 
same conditions. (Condorcet 1994: 584) 
Bernoulli had written ([1738] 1954: 25): «any increase in wealth, now matter how 
insignificant, will always result in an increase in utility which is inversely proportionate to 
the quantity of goods already possessed»; this led through integration to a logarithmic 
utility function. Yet, Condorcet disliked this kind of both too simple and too precise 










































5. Though other hypotheses had been proposed as to the shape of the function 
such as Cramer’s or Buffon’s
6, no one had taken issue with Bernoulli’s as straightforwardly 
as Condorcet did
7. 
The example chosen by Condorcet in the 1784 reveals the target of his objection: the 
accuracy of the model describing the merchant’s propensity to buy insurance contracts 
Against Bernoulli, it is contended that rationality does not always lead to computing a 
certainty equivalent of random prospects. Merchants are only supposed to decide whether 
they will accept or deny an offer, or which random prospect they will choose among a 
given set.  
A reasonable man should enter into business only if he finds a fairly high 
probability to get his investment back, with common interest and the price of 
his labour. 
Such man will doubtless require the probability not to lose his funds wholly 
(saving at least what is needed for the subsistence of his family) to be close 
to certainty; as well as the probability not to diminish his funds by more than 
a given amount to be very large  too. (Condorcet [1784] 1994: 86) 
Condorcet then argues that both a fairly high probability to earn one’s life together with a 
very small probability not to lose the necessary funds for subsistence are  required in order 
to undertake any investment. In other words, if the justification of Bernoullian EUF 
depended on how they captured and generalised our intuitions about how the wise 
entrepreneurs decide, Condorcet replies that they fail to do so. They are misspecified in two 
ways, for attention should be paid to probability, and not only to the utility of gains. Once 
defined, the model will not give us a continuous series of expected gains but limit-values 
on which decisions should be made (minimal anticipated profit in order to undertake, 
minimum selling price given the insurance rate, etc.).  
However, Condorcet could only draft an alternative rule. Unlike Bernoulli, he did not plan 
to account for prices of aleatory contracts, but wanted instead to set rational boundaries in 
the negotiation between two parties
8 —perhaps a reminiscence of Turgot (Hervier 1997: 
                                                 
5 Condorcet wrote in 1771 to Pietro Verri: «You say that the price is inversely proportional to the number of 
sellers, and proportional to the number of buyers. I know very well that the price rises when the number of 
buyers do, so does it declines when the number of sellers rises; but shall we say that the variations are 
proportional? Thus, the mathematical language, in this case, as well as in any other of this kind [emphasis 
added],  far from leading to more precise ideas, seems to me misleading; I think the author should have 
preferred ordinary language if only he did not want to make a rigorously exact statement [e. a.]» (Condorcet 
[*], 1994, pp. 70-71). 
6 Cramer proposed two utility function: one is the square root of wealth, the other has an upper limit. See 
Cramer [1728] 1975: 561. Buffon, after a trip to Geneva where Cramer lived agrees on both the upper limit of 
utility and the decreasing marginal utility of wealth (see Buffon [1777] 1977): «[One] would not be, for 
instance, happier with a thousand of million than with a hundred...» (apud Weill 1961: 117). 
7 D’Alembert (1768 [*]: 77) wrote about the other theories that they «all rest on arguments that do not belong 
to the question, such as the condition & fortune of the players. Therefore these solutions contradict one 
another, and annihilate themselves». This reminds us of Condorcet’s argument : one can not choose between 
arbitrary hypothesis. 
8 «The insurance rate results from competition, it is for every kind of risk determined by some mean between 
that part of profit the merchant can give away, and that is necessary for the insurer to have a very high 









































887-ff), who had been his political mentor. Yet, the justification for any rule he could have 
proposed was found again in the example of those who successfully deal with risky 
choices: 
[We need to] learn how men, who are known to be wise and whose projects 
succeeded, practically solved the same problem. For instance, what has been 
the probability not to lose that insurers obtained from various insurance 
bureaus who carried on their business profitably. (Condorcet [1784] 1994: 
492) 
After his 1784 piece, Condorcet  returned twice to this topic but did not achieved a 
complete specification of the rule. His main concern was to settle a probability threshold 
for decision making by empirical means. In 1785, the problem seems to be there were too 
many relevant thresholds (and therefore, no definite decision rule): 
The limit of probability, the value beyond which we shall not fall, can not be 
given a fixed value. It can and must fluctuate according to the disadvantages 
that result from error or from lack of decision that impairs action. It must 
depends above all on the subject at hand. (Condorcet [1785] 1986: 73) 
Later, Condorcet offered an indirect evaluation of the thresholds. Rather than looking for 
every one of the aforementioned thresholds («lose his funds wholly», «saving at least what 
is needed for the subsistence of his family», «not to diminish his funds by more than a 
given amount», «get his investment back», «with common interest and the price of his 
labour»), Condorcet focuses on the concept of moral certainty, i. e. a probability so low 
that one could rationally neglect the risk associated. Thus, Condorcet argues that only 
«very light risks to which we expose ourselves willingly» should be considered, such as the 
risk 
[T]o die with the ferry during a journey from Calais to Dover. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any such data; but we can replace them with 
combinations of elements form the mortality tables.(Condorcet [1787] [*]: 
583)
9
Unfortunately, this suggestion did not yield a precise mathematical formula either. 
However even if Condorcet did not achieved a well rounded decision rule, it is still worth 
considering the argumentative pattern of both his objections and proposal. He questioned 
the presumed generality of Bernoulli’s decision rule on the basis of the same empirical 
evidence that was said to support it, i.e., our intuitions about what constituted a wise 
decision under risk. He tried to state a different rule in which the specification of the 
probability and the utility functions were specified in accordance with the practice of «men, 
who are known to be wise» and «whose projects succeeded». I.e, the adoption of the model 
as a decision rule depends on the acknowledgment of the consequential force of these 
                                                                                                                                                     
mean price will be from the latter, the more the price of goods [sold by merchant] will fall for final 
consumers.» (Condorcet [1784] 1994: 488) 
9 Condorcet does not say much here, probably because the reference to mortality tables is the beginning of a 
ramble across the garden of Buffon: the master of Montbard had already set the threshold for moral certainty 
as the risk for a 56 year old man to die in the present day (Buffon [1777] 1977: 38). Given the aforementioned 










































8cases: it described only the behaviour of a particular group of capable agents, but for the 
rest of us the wise decision would be to imitate their behaviour by applying the model as a 
rule to our own particular choices.  
3. 1950: EUF REAPPEAR  
After an apparent eclipse of about 150 years (Schlee 1992), EUFs came again to the fore 
when von Neumann and Morgenstern chose them to append a decision model to their 
theory of games
10. Expected utility theory (EUT) was now explicitly presented as a positive 
technique for the descriptive analysis of economic decisions, free from any normative 
implications. Yet, in this section we will examine how the argumentative pattern already 
applied by Bernoulli and Condorcet to justify the prescriptive use of EUF recurs once more.  
Within the French community of mathematical economists there were many who doubted 
the proclaimed scientific success of EUT and a conference was organized in 1952 in Paris 
to debate it. Maurice Allais, as most French participants, objected to its descriptive 
relevance through counterexamples, pairs of choices that were supposed to induce 
violations of EUT. The most famous came to be the Allais Paradox. The decision-maker 
was sequentially exposed to a couple of equivalent choices: in virtue of the independence 
axiom, the expected utility of the first pair of alternatives was exactly the same as that of 
the second pair, so that his election among the first couple should allow us to predict his 
decision as to the second.  Leonard Jimmie Savage treated them as if they were not 
equivalent  during a private lunch with Allais, who tried to get some more responses during 
the conference
11 and conducted by mail a survey to the same effect soon afterwards —its 
results only went to print thirty years later (Allais 1979). By the end of the 1950s the 
paradox was widely considered an anecdote, even if it may now be read as an anticipation 
of the experimental results against EUT that were delivered a decade afterwards. Perhaps it 
seemed somehow acceptable to dismiss those observed deviations from EUT that appeared 
to be normatively indefensible. Mistakes would not count as refutations (Starmer 2005)
12.  
But we should note here that Allais was contesting EUT simultaneously at both levels: it 
failed to positively predict the result of certain kind of choices and these cannot be 
dismissed as normatively irrational. This second argument is of interest here since it will 
show us how empirical considerations had again a normative impact, both to contest 
someone else’s theory and to justify one’s own. 
First of all, according to Allais, rationality turns out to be too general a category if we 
simply define it as obedience to the axioms of EUT: even if we have an ordered set of 
choices, compliance to the axiom of absolute preference and a suitable probability 
                                                 
10 For an in-depth historical analysis of the content of this section cf. Jallais and Pradier 2005. 
11 In spite of Allais occasional claim that all of them fell into the trap, a careful examination of  Allais 1979 
shows that only Shackle (who firmly stands against EUF from 1949 on), de Finetti et Malinvaud were caught. 
12 Yet, a methodological justification of such dimissal is quite difficult to build up. Francesco Guala (2000) 
has tried to rationalize as a Lakatosian monster-barring strategy. Counterexamples against a theory of 
decision-making can only be considered so when we can capture the exception they represent in terms of 
another theory, conveying a different idea of rationality. According to Guala, our normative views about 
rationality would provide some sort of positive heuristics for research, by way of non-refutable hardcore. This 
strategy, we should add, does only make sense if we accept to treat rationality as a thick term and accept that 
theoreticians move at will between its normative and positive part. So that if a falsifier for the latter appears, it 









































8distribution, there are in fact many different decision functions, linear in probability, where 
these three constraints do not bear any analytically tractable functional form (Allais [1952] 
1979: 34-41). Why should we choose the particular specification defended by the American 
School? In other words, which normative intuition about rationality does it capture that 
makes it so compelling (as to discard other alternatives)? Here is where the argumentative 
pattern we already observed in Bernoulli and Condorcet recurs. Allais advocates an 
experimental definition of rationality to test whether the normative intuition captured by 
EUT is as convincing as it should be: 
To observe the behaviour of men whom one has reason in other respects to believe 
act rationally (Allais [1952] 1979: 79). 
“Men whom one has reason in other respects to believe act rationally” are a new instance of 
the “wise” Condorcetian decision-makers or the “fairly judicious” Bernoullian merchants. 
But now these experts were identified within a different profession: they were «persons of 
high scientific achievement, and very well versed in probability theory» (Allas 1979:  466). 
Here was again the Condorcetian test: if they failed to use a model properly, we should 
discard the latter as a normative standard rather than blame it on their irrationality. If a 
talented mathematician such as Savage could not act in accordance with the axioms 
defining EUT, could someone expect more from an ordinary decision maker?
13
The burden of proof was thus reversed: EUT supporters must now show that “that persons 
acting this way are behaving irrationally” (Allais [1952] 1979: 92). The Frenchman 
boasted: “If somebody does wish to argue the contrary, it would be quite fascinating to hear 
his grounds!” (Allais [1952] 1979: 92)
14. Allais’ trust in the normative cogency of the 
practical decisions made by scientists might be rooted in his own education in the 
Napoleonic École Polytechnique, whose graduates, after a very demanding scientific 
training, were appointed at the highest positions in the French public industry. Allais was 
himself a mining engineer, and in such capacity had hold various positions in the French 
administration from 1937 to 1948. He had cared then about the improvement of the 
decision rules already applied by his subordinates: in 1949 he had published a study of their 
efficiency, surveying the statistical data they generated. In  1953 he put to use his ideas on 
risky decision-making in a report on the convenience of investing in mining explorations in 
Alger
15. In other words, Allais was interested in the prescriptive use of decision theory and 
granted that EUT could play such a role. He only thought it normatively ungrounded. 
The «American» supporters of EUT chose not to respond probably not as a result of their 
simple distaste for normative discussion. As Paul Samuelson put it, «just as you cannot 
argue about tastes, you cannot, from a purely deductive point of view, argue about axioms» 
                                                 
13 «Those surveyed in the context of the 1952 experiment were highly conversant with the theory of 
probabilities, having generally extensive mathematical knowledge and being persons likely to be commonly 
considered as “rational” from the standpoint of all the available criteria, apart from any criteria relating to 
random choice» (Allais 1979: 468). The qualifications of the subjects who later on responded to an additional 
questionnaire are listed in Allais 1979: 613-614. 
14 His words were echoed years later by other experimental analysts of the violations of EUT: e.g, “Are they 
foolish ? […] it seems out of the question summarily to judge their behaviour as irrational: I am included 
among them” (Ellsberg 1961: 669; emphasis added). 
15 «During the years 1953-1954, I undertook concrete application of the theses I had propounded at the 1952 
meeting. The opportunity arose in connection with an operational research project for the Bureau de 









































8(CNRS 1953: 143). They preferred not to treat rationality as a thick predicate and restrained 
themselves to explore the empirical consequences of the theory, leaving its normative 
dimensions aside. Yet, it is important to notice that those who acknowledged the thickness 
of rationality conducted the discussion in the terms that distinguished the argumentative 
pattern we have been examining. Let us briefly consider the following two responses. 
After being exposed to the Allaisian test, Savage moved from a positive to a normative 
understanding of EUT. He granted, like Allais, that its cogency as a rule for wise decision-
making depended mostly on the judgment of experts
16. The independence axiom 
incorporated into EUT would indeed capture a «universally known and recognized» 
principle, whose «intuitive appeal» is «unique among maxims for wise action» (Friedman 
and Savage 1952: 468). Therefore, it is not a principle that one would «deliberately 
violate». Apparently Paul Samuelson was not very willing to accept it, but Savage 
convinced him using the Dutch book argument: those who do not comply with the axiom 
expose themselves to serious losses
17. The decision rule is now justifed a priori as a pre-
requirement for anyone’s practical success: it is a recipe against failure and it can be 
obtained from purely theoretical considerations, without recourse to experience. Yet, it 
coincides with the best criterion already in use. 
An different take along the same lines was proposed by Jacob Marschak in his 1951 essay 
«Why “should” statisticians and businessmen maximize “moral expectation”?». The 
normative dimension is acknowledged straightforwardly, but it is now affirmed a priori: 
norms are now a matter of logic  and at no claim is made as to its actual compliance 
(Marschak 1951: 493, 505). Yet, those who act against them do not behave reasonably for 
the usual consequentialist consideration (now a positive one): «in the long run, it pays to be 
reasonable» (Marschak 1951: 496). In our terms, acting in accordance with EUT delivers 
practical success
18. To prove this, Marschak tries to derive from the rule of maximizing 
expected utility the satisfaction of «the rule of long run success»: under certain assumptions 
(admittedly not very plausible), it will be almost certain that a sequence of strategies 
maximizing expected utility will outperform any other utilitarian decision rule (Marschak 
1951: 504-5). 
Be it to avoid failure or to achieve success, EUT provided an a priori justified rule that 
captured our intuitions about how wise decisions are made under uncertainty and was, thus, 
normatively cogent. And we should note here that Allais contested Savage and Marschak’s 
claims to show that no such rule could be attained on mere considerations of principle. Let 
us briefly discuss his response to see how empirical considerations again came to support 
his normative case. 
In order not to beg the question, argued Allais, rationality should not be a priori identified 
with a given set of axioms (Allais [1952] 1979: 77-78). He departed thus from a more 
                                                 
16 «Success of the maxim in this domain [statistical theory], as in any other area of decision involving 
uncertainty, depends, not only on its empirical verification for the economic behavior of men at large, but on 
its acceptability to individuals who are particularly concerned with such decision, as a rule guiding “wise” 
behavior in the face of uncertainty» (Friedman and Savage 1952: 463n). 
17 «[A]s Savage pointed out to me in a 1950 letter, duplicating a similar argument that had been made by 
Frank P. Ramsey prior to 1930, if I behave like an Ysidro, I can, so to speak, make book against myself and 
end up making —or shall I say losing?— money!» (Samuelson 1965: 124) 









































8general stance in which it could be defined on the basis of the consistency of someone’s 
ends, be these what they may, and the use of the appropriate means to achieve them (Allais 
[1952] 1979: 70). Mathematically, he represented this through a functional of the objective 
frequency function of the psychological values of the expected gains —satisfying the axiom 
of absolute  EUF would constitute here just a possible specification of such functional. 
More precisely, one in which the dispersion of psychological values about their mean (the 
impact of the spread of gains and losses) is not taken into account, which led Allais to 
conclude: 
In point of fact, it would be improper to brand a cautious man irrational because he 
is willing to accept a lower psycho-mathematical expectation as the price of lower 
dispersion. Nor can a person who enjoys risk as such be labelled irrational, merely 
because he accepts a lower psycho-mathematical expectation as the counterpart of 
the availability of some chance of extremely high psychological gain He may be felt 
to be imprudent -this as it may be- but it seems impossible to say that he is 
irrational. (Allais [1952] 1979: 70; cf. 86-95 for a discussion of various examples) 
In other words, rationality is now separated from prudence, so that acting in accordance to 
any theory of uncertain decision-making would convey no particular promise of practical 
success. Against Savage’s Dutch book argument, Allais objects that the expected utility of 
a gain is not psychologically independent of the gains that may be obtained with more 
certain or uncertain probability (Allais [1952] 1979: 98-99). The fact that people whose 
rationality is widely acknowledged violate the independence axiom shows that obeying it in 
all possible situations may actually be irrational (CNRS 1953: 315). As for Marschak´s 
argument, Allais replies (Allais [1952] 1979: 71-72) that most random decisions relate to 
isolated events in which long-term considerations are irrelevant. Summing up: 
The governing factor here is personal psychology. Some will prefer to rely on 
mathematical expectation, others will attach greater probability to the form of the 
distribution. No rule of conduct can be considered as more rational than other. 
(Allais [1952] 1979: 72) 
However, prudence alone retained its normative appeal to justify the application of a given 
decision model, in accordance to our argumentative pattern: «Observation shows that 
prudent businessmen act as though they were balancing the probable gain g against the 
probability P of a loss exceeding X» (Allais [1952] 1979: 92). Their strategy can be easily 
captured by his theory and implemented for practical purposes. Which he did in 1953 when 
his advice was sought on the opportunity of mining explorations in Algeria (Allais 1957): 
The guiding principle was to offer the Mining Research Office of Algeria a 
reasonable compromise beween the mathematical expectation of the gains that 
might be expected and the probability of ruin. (Allais 1979: 451) 
To sum up, in 1952 Allais contested not only the predictive value of EUT, but also its 
normative cogency according to the same argumentative pattern already applied by 
Bernoulli and Condorcet. Namely, to test the moral cogency of a choice rule depending on 
its empirical correspondence to admittedly wise decision-making. His case was probably 
not much appreciated, but let us just a few words on that by way of conclusion 









































8We have examined three different episodes in the development of EUF, in all of which a 
similar argumentative pattern recurs to provide an empirical justification for EUF-based 
norms. For those who accept the consequentialist principle that, when facing risky choices, 
it is better to imitate the decision rule applied by those who are acknowledged as experts, 
the crucial issue is to identify it empirically. Bernoulli tried to capture it in the choices of 
merchants and insurers using EUF. Condorcet disputed that these wise decision makers 
estimated their utility and probability as Bernoulli suggested and argued for an empirical 
elaboration of an alternative rule, which was left unfinished. Allais appealed again to the 
impossibility to reconcile EUT with the behavior observed in those agents that are widely 
considered rational and suggested a more concordant alternative to replace it. 
Given now that this sort of argument consistently appeared at two crucial stages in the 
development of EUF, we may wonder why it has been mostly ignored so far. It can be in 
part explained by the little appreciation for experiments that economists and philosophers 
alike showed until very recently. As a matter of fact, on the economist’ side, experiments 
on EUT brought again to the fore its normative dimension [*], though without much debate 
as to the justification of the prescriptive rules derived therefrom. As for the philosophers, at 
least in the analytic tradition, experiments are just emerging as a source of relevant 
evidence to test moral theories [*]. We may expect then that a more naturalist approach to 
normativity will bring more attention to the arguments presented by our three authors.  
Yet, even on this basis, it may be argued that they just constitute a very preliminary attempt 
at the empirical justification of decision rules. First, because the identification of the 
population of experts (be it merchants, insurers or statisticians) whose decision criteria 
should be rendered explicit it is as such problematic. It is a broad social category in which 
we should draw a sample of exemplary decision-makers. Who do we take as such is in 
itself a matter of normative controversy, that should be settled before any experiment takes 
place. In addition, since the normative justification we are looking for is consequential, we 
need to show that these experts owe their practical success —at least in part— to the 
systematic application of the decision rules under study, and not just to mere chance. 
Otherwise, the imitation of the experts would yield no prospect of consequential interest. 
Still, those who want to explore this experimental approach to normative issues can claim 
the authority of several founding fathers of decision theory to vindicate their enterprise. 
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